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The Promise and Problematics of Legal
Ethics from the Lawyer's Point of View
Ted Schneyer*
In his rich meditation on the ethical condition of the contemporary
American bar,' Daniel Markovits couples a philosophic argument about
legal ethics with a theory about long-term cultural trends and their effect
on the profession. The argument is basically diagnostic. It does not
address "whether the present regime of legal ethics - the law governing
lawyers as it stands - is justified," "what ethical principles should ideally
govern the professional conduct of lawyers," 2 or how lawyers should act
in concrete situations. Instead, it takes the "present regime" as a "given"
and offers an account of what it must be like - "not psychologically but
ethically" - to practice under it.3 The account purports to explain a
"commonly observed crisis" in today's legal profession that may be linked
to "other crises of moral justification . . . in the modem world."4 The
explanation on offer is that cultural trends have made it increasingly
difficult for "modem adversary lawyers"5 to justify their practices to
themselves by embracing traditional role-based ideals and descriptions of
their work.
Professor Markovits also claims that normative scholarship in legal
ethics has been largely "inadequate to the moral problems that face
Milton 0. Riepe Professor of Law, James E. Rogers College of Law, University of Arizona.
1. Daniel Markovits, Legal Ethics from the Lawyer's Point of View, 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 209
(2004) [hereinafter Markovits].
2. Id. at 210.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 211. Markovits cites evidence that the "crisis" is commonly remarked, but not that any
crisis that actually exists reflects ethical rather than psychological stresses. See id. at 211 n.1 (citing
studies that detect high levels of job-dissatisfaction and depression among lawyers - and not just
litigators - as well as perceptions that practice has changed for the worse, but also citing a rigorous
study of the Chicago bar that reaches contrary conclusions).
5. The few concrete lawyering situations that Markovits mentions involve litigation, but he often
seems to use the term "modem adversary lawyers" to describe lawyers more generally. And his
expansive definition of an adversary legal system as one in which lawyers represent "particular clients
rather than justice writ large" and do so with "warm zeal," id. at 212, seems as applicable to lawyer-
negotiators as it is to litigators.
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practicing lawyers' 6 because it fails to attend to the lawyer's own point of
view. He hopes that his emphasis on the lawyer's viewpoint can clarify
those problems and serve as a first step toward solving them,7 though he
does not explain how.
This Essay is a critique of Markovits's argument by an academic lawyer
with no formal training in moral philosophy but a sustained interest in
what moral philosophy can (and cannot) contribute to normative legal
ethics, 8 which I conceive as a practical body of thought generated chiefly
within the profession for the purpose of guiding and evaluating lawyers'
conduct. Part I highlights the features of the argument that figure in my
subsequent analysis. Part II takes up several aspects of the argument that I
find problematic, including the account of the history of the American bar
that anchors Markovits's conclusion that cultural forces are making role-
based self-justification unavailable to lawyers. Part III begins with a
summary of Markovits's imaginative and sympathetic articulation of the
"distinctively lawyerly virtues" of loyalty and statesmanship that may
have helped lawyers over the years to justify their practices to themselves
and thus to preserve their integrity in the face of criticism based on
"ordinary morality." Part III then situates those virtues within an ongoing
normative debate in legal ethics by considering their "goodness of fit"
with the new models of the lawyer's role that Professors Norman
Spaulding 9 and Bradley Wendel"° have recently developed.
I. KEY FEATURES OF THE ARGUMENT
A. The distinction between first- and third-personal morality
For Professor Markovits, the ethically salient fact about American
lawyers is that they practice in an adversary legal system, which entails
zealously "represent[ing] particular clients rather than justice writ large"
and "manipulat[ing]" facts and law to benefit their clients. 1 Unlike
legislators, who are charged "to fairly balance the interests and claims of
all persons," and unlike judges, who are charged "to discern a true account
of the facts of a case and to apply the law dispassionately to these facts,"
adversary lawyers "are often required to do" things for clients that would
6. Id. at 211.
7. Id. at 212.
8. See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, Reforming Law Practice in the Pursuit of Justice: The Perils of
Privileging "Public" over Professional Values, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 1831, 1839-49 (2002); Ted
Schneyer, Some Sympathy for the Hired Gun, 41 J. LEGAL ED. I I (1991); Ted Schneyer, Moral
Philosophy's Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 1529.
9. Norman W. Spaulding, Reinterpreting Professional Identity, 74 U. COLO. L. REv. 1 (2003).
10. W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (2004).
11. Markovits, supra note 1, at 212.
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be immoral if done by "ordinary people in ordinary circumstances."12
Criticizing and defending that conduct has been "the central preoccupation
of academic work on legal ethics,"13 but Markovits claims that both sides
have failed to see that the criticism involves two distinct charges.14
The first charge is that lawyers, by privileging client interests over
others, violate the principle of impartiality, which is central in ordinary
moral assessment. 5 Lawyers pursue and are duty-bound to pursue
outcomes that their clients favor but that may be unfair to others,1 6 as
when a trial lawyer helps a client avoid liability by invoking the statute of
limitations yet believes that her client committed the alleged wrong and
has a moral duty to redress it.17 This charge would not become moot even
if the adversary system's demands became somewhat less ruthless. 18
The second charge accuses lawyers not of partiality or "generic
unfairness," but of "particular vices with familiar names."' 9 It asserts that
their duty of zealous representation often requires lawyers to "present
versions of the facts that they do not themselves believe,"20 to "make
colorable legal arguments that they reject," to press "facially valid claims"
for their clients in order to delay a lawsuit or otherwise gain a strategic
12. Id. This characterization is meant to "focus on" litigators, but it is far from clear that
Markovits considers it inapplicable to other lawyers. Although he states that lawyers acting as
negotiators or as legal compliance advisors "will generally be less one-sided," he quickly adds that
such distinctions should not be overstated. Id. at 212 n.3. Moreover, the criticisms of lawyers with
which Markovits is chiefly concerned - namely, that their role requires them to lie, cheat, and abuse
others - have not been aimed at litigators alone.
13. Id. at 212 & n.4 (citing examples). This has indeed been a preoccupation since 1975 or so, but
in Ralph Nader's heyday (circa 1960 to 1975), legal ethics scholars mostly focused on the distribution
of legal services and on "agency" problems in client-lawyer relations, such as shoddy service, neglect,
and fee abuse. See Ted Schneyer, Teaching Legal Ethics to Yuppies, THE BAR EXAMINER, Feb. 1988,
at 4 (noting changing fashions in ethics teaching and scholarship).
14. Markovits, supra note I, at 213.
15. Id.
16. Markovits claims that lawyers are not only forbidden by the rules of legal ethics to act on
grounds of moral conscience in ways that undermine a client's case, but are forbidden as well to
withdraw from representation on such grounds. Id. at 216 n.17 & 219 n.28. This is incorrect, See
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(4) (2003) (permitting withdrawal or, in pending
litigation, motions to withdraw when a client insists on "action that the lawyer considers repugnant or
with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement" - even if withdrawal would adversely affect
the client's interests) (hereinafter MODEL RULES]. Lawyers may also limit the scope of some
engagements by excluding actions that they considcr "repugnant or imprudent." Id. at R. 1.2(c) & cmt.
17.
17. Markovits, supra note 1, at 215. Lawyers are also open to the charge that they violate the
impartiality principle when they reject clients who cannot pay their fees. But Markovits thinks lawyers
do this "because of their greed and not because of their roles." Id. at 214 n.8. Since greed is not
distinctive to lawyers, he finds this uninteresting as a matter of legal ethics. Id. It should be noted,
however, that ethics rules exhort lawyers to perform some pro bono work. See MODEL RULES, supra
note 16, at R. 6.1. Lawyers who fail to do such work are arguably deviating from their professional
role.
18. Markovits, supra note 1, at 216-17.
19 Id. at 218-
20. This assertion calls for qualification. Lawyers may not knowingly offer false evidence to a
tribunal, MODEL RULES, supra note 16, R. 3.3(a)(3), and, except when representing criminal
defendants, may refuse to offer evidence they reasonably believe to be false. Id. at R.3.3 cmt. T 9.
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advantage, and to impeach opposition witnesses in order to undermine
"even testimony they believe to be truthful."21 Markovits takes this to
mean that lawyers are obliged by their role to act in "ordinarily immoral,"
"vicious" ways - namely, to "lie," "cheat," and "abuse others."22
What does the second charge add to the first? On one view, which
Markovits calls the "dependence thesis," the charge that lawyers lie, cheat,
and abuse simply elaborates on the general charge of unjustified
partiality.23 Markovits rejects this thesis, arguing that the vices lawyers are
accused of "cannot be reduced to forms of impermissible partiality" and
that the two charges play themselves out in "different moral registers,
tuned to two distinct moral points of view."2 4
The charge that lawyers are impermissibly partial rests on "third-
personal" moral ideals that construe one's duties to others on the premise
that all lives are equally important. To answer that charge, lawyers must
convince the world at large that favoring client interests ultimately
"respects or promotes everyone's interests"25 because lawyers are part of a
division of legal labor that is designed to protect everyone's rights.
Charges that lawyers commit the ordinary vices of lying, cheating, and
abusing play in a "first-personal moral register," which directs a person to
formulate and live up to appropriate ideals for herself.26 To answer these
charges, lawyers must convince themselves that their work reflects
"virtues that belong to a form of life" one might reasonably aspire to make
her own,27 not vices that ordinarily good people avoid. On this view, even
if lawyers are third-personally justified in adopting practices that favor
their clients, they must still construct a first-personal account that casts
their practices "as part of a life they can endorse."28 The third-personal
argument that the lawyer's ostensibly vicious role in a division of labor is
impartially justified as a necessary evil cannot succeed from the lawyer's
point of view, because she will not want to "think of herself as evil at
all.
, 29
21. Markovits, supra note 1, at 219.
22. Id. at 220. Markovits admits that these are "tendentious descriptions of what lawyers do," but
feels justified in using them because they are commonly used by others. Id. at 219 n.29. Of course,
common descriptions are not always accurate or apt, and I will argue in Part 1I that, even by ordinary
moral standards, "lying" and "cheating" misdescribe some of the conduct Markovits has in mind. But
Markovits seems more interested in whether lawyers consider themselves guilty of lying, cheating, and
abusing than in whether a neutral arbiter applying ordinary moral principles should find them guilty.




27. Id. at 221.
28. Id.
29. Id. (emphasis in original). Markovits derives his distinction between first- and third-personal
morality from broad traditions in moral philosophy. The utilitarian and Kantian traditions focus on
third-personal impartial justification, the former holding that each person's utility should count equally
in evaluating conduct and the latter holding that one should treat all others as ends in themselves and
[Vol. 16:45
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To refute the dependency thesis, Markovits has us imagine that Jim
(presumably an American abroad) is confronted by a dictator who has
captured twenty political prisoners and who offers Jim a stark choice:
"[E]ither Jim must kill one of the prisoners or the dictator will kill all
twenty. '30 The moral principle that one should never kill innocents is one
of Jim's most deeply held ideals. Even if third-personal impartial morality
would justify killing one innocent in order to save nineteen, Jim "may
have a good first-personal ethical reason" not to do so, because - although
more innocents will die as a result - Jim will not be complicit in any
killing.3 1 Markovits concedes that, given the numbers involved, Jim may
reasonably decide to betray his ideal and kill a prisoner, but not that the
moral relevance of this betrayal would be erased for Jim by the third-
personal justification that convinced him on balance to kill.31 Concern for
his own integrity could give Jim "a reason to pursue his first-personal aim
of not killing innocents" even if this is not third-personally best.33
Conceivably, however, someone else in Jim's shoes could kill an
innocent yet remain true to her first-personal ideals. To illustrate this
possibility, Markovits contrasts Jim's case with Jane's. Jane leads a
movement to overthrow the dictator, and her ideals are better adapted to
the ruthless ethical climate that exists in the dictator's realm. 34 Although
not as means. Id. at 223 n.30. By contrast, the older Aristotelian tradition approaches ethical
justification from the moral agent's own point of view, holding that one should strive to live according
to "his own suitable life plan" and to achieve "his own admirable ends." Id. at 223. Kantians and
utilitarians may believe that ethics is purely third-personal, while Markovits appears to believe that
third-personal assessment is an "add-on" to first-personal ethics and that third- and first-personal
assessment can lead to contradictory conclusions about the justifiability of conduct. But he takes no
firm position as to whether, when, or to what degree third-personal assessment should credit the fact
that an actor has a first-personal justification for his action. If his emphasis on first-personal
assessment is ever to serve as a step toward solving certain moral problems that lawyers face, as he
hopes, see text accompanying note 7 supra, these issues may need attention. We often think that
people of integrity are more likely than others to behave in third-personally-justified ways. But, as
David Luban wisely points out, if one's integrity depends merely on keeping one's actions and ideals
in line, its power to promote third-personally-justified conduct will depend on the substance of those
ideals, some of which may only be rationalizations of third-personally unjustified conduct for the sake
of avoiding cognitive dissonance. David Luban, Integrity: Its Causes and Cures, 72 FORDHAM L. REV.
279, 298-301 (2003). "[T]he quest for integrity," Luban writes, "can drive us to the high road or the
low road, without any landmarks to alert us about which path we have chosen." Id. at 304 (emphasis in
original).
30. Markovits, supra note 1, at 226.
31. Id.at227.
32. Id. at 228. Markovits adds that a moral agent's integrity depends on "his understanding his
ethical ideals as more than merely rules-of-thumb or interim conclusions in a third-person impartial
ethical argument." Id. at 257 n.91. Indeed, he considers it "uncertain whether a person whose
attachment to his own ends hangs by only the thin thread of circumstance can properly be said to have
adopted . . . any ends as his own at all." Id. at 270 n.102. But even if one's ideals cannot be up for
constant reassessment, qualifying an ideal in light of a rare and unanticipated dilemma hardly
transforms it into a mere rule-of-thumb. And a moral agent in Jim's shoes who embraces from the
outset the more nuanced ideal that one should not kill innocents unless doing so will save more
innocents, and who responds to the dictator's proposal by killing an innocent, will not have had to
reassess his ideal at all.
33. Id. at 230.
34. Id. at 259.
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she despises killing innocents, her circumstances do not permit her to
embrace Jim's ideal. Instead, her ideal is to overthrow the dictator by
virtually any means necessary in order to secure her people's freedom:
Accordingly, when Jane accepts the dictator's offer and kills [an
innocent prisoner], she can develop an account of her actions that
makes them consistent with her first-personal ... ideals and that does
not require her to see herself as abandoning her own ideals in favor of
the dictator's simply because third-personal impartial morality
requires it. Although she is, regrettably, killing an innocent, Jane is
also pursuing political liberation with the courage and self-command
she admires ... ; and she can therefore recast the dead innocent as a
casualty of a guerilla war to which she is committed, and recast her
part in the killing as a battlefield decision that displays the steely
virtues of effective command. Although killing the [innocent]
represents a defeat for Jane because, against her ultimate purposes,
another innocent has been killed, the killing does not represent a
betrayal of Jane's first-personal ideals, and her integrity remains
intact.
35
In contrasting Jim's case with Jane's, Markovits means to emphasize the
cultural differences that commend the never-kill-innocents ideal to him
but commend the ideal of pursuing political liberation through
revolutionary means to her.
3 6
B. The failure of legal ethics scholarship to focus on problems offirst-
personal morality
Markovits asserts that legal ethics scholars have focused solely on the
third-personal problem of lawyer partiality and have treated the "lawyerly
vices [as] nothing more than special (perhaps particularly egregious) cases
of this partiality."37 For example, defenders of the present regime rely on
the third-personal claim that conduct of which lawyers themselves might
disapprove if it occurred outside of law practice does not breach the
impartiality principle, because the adversary system that encourages or
requires that conduct reflects a desirable division of labor for securing
35. Id. (emphasis in original).
36. See id. (stating that "Jim's failure at squaring the demands of third- and first-personal ethical
justification may be tied to the fact that the circumstances of the dictator's offer were entirely foreign
to him, and Jane's success may be tied to the fact that the offer found her in familiar circumstances").
37. Id. at 261. This has certainly been a dominant theme, but not all legal ethics scholars focus
solely on issues of public policy or third-personal morality. See, e.g., Spaulding, supra note 9, at 59
nn. 161-63 (citing authorities); Serena Stier, Legal Ethics: The Integrity Thesis, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 551
(1991) (arguing that modem lawyers can abide by the rules of legal ethics, properly construed, without
jeopardizing their moral integrity). Markovits does note that scholars have explored the psychological
costs that adversary lawyering imposes on lawyers, but he views psychological and integrity costs as
distinct. Markovits, supra note 1, at 261 n.94. Notwithstanding Aristotle's view that human flourishing
requires fidelity to one's ethical ideals, Markovits apparently sees no necessary connection between
one's integrity and one's psychological well-being.
[Vol. 16:45
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(Here Markovits himself takes a third-personal detour. Though less than
confident that everyone's rights can be adequately protected by a system
in which "lawyers care exclusively about their clients,"39 Markovits does
not reject this third-personal claim. Indeed, he suggests that the adversary
system can be impartially justified, at least if our "(largely)
unreconstructed" system can be moderated so that lawyers commit the
lawyerly vices "less freely and less brutally."4 He also thinks that the
adversary system will endure in some recognizable form in any event, so
not all lawyering that ordinary morality would consider vicious can be
eliminated.)4 1
As for critics of the present regime, Markovits notes that, with rare
exceptions, they pursue incremental reforms to make our legal system
better at impartially protecting everyone's rights but remain committed to
the adversary system itself, without worrying whether the system requires
lawyers to engage in vicious conduct that is inconsistent with their
personal ideals.42 (Returning briefly to the third-personal realm, Markovits
seems to welcome this effort to work from within. Rejecting adversarial
lawyering out of hand, he writes, would carry the disturbing implication
that all lawyers should "sit in judgment over their clients" and, like judges,
determine "how legal disputes should be resolved.")
4 3
38. Id. at 262. Similarly, the partiality that parents show toward their children may be justified in
terms of a division of labor in the societal enterprise of child rearing.
39 Id. If it is tendentious to describe adversary lawyers as commonly lying, cheating, and abusing
others, as Markovits concedes, see supra note 22, it seems no less so to describe the adversary system
as one in which lawyers "care exclusively about their clients." For one thing, litigators have important
duties running to the tribunal itself. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. PRO. R. II (barring the filing of frivolous
motions); MODEL RULES, supra note 16, at R. 3.3(a)(2), (3) (imposing duties to reveal legal authority
adverse to a position asserted on a client's behalf and not to offer false evidence). Markovits may view
such rules as mere constraints and not as evidence that litigators really "care" about non-client
interests. But there is evidence that litigators in some fields care deeply about certain third parties, not
about their clients alone, and are encouraged to do so by professional norms. For example, many
litigators who represent spouses in custody disputes consider themselves "obligated to consider the
best interests of children." American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, The Bounds ofAdvocacy, 9 J.
AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW 1, 3 (1992). And conduct intended to discharge this obligation,
whatever its status in the past, does not constitute role deviance today. The nonbinding standards
promulgated by a leading association of matrimonial lawyers sanction the approach. Id. at 6-39.
40. Markovits, supra note 1, at 265. Oddly, while Markovits calls our adversary system "largely
unreconstructed," he acknowledges in practically the same breath that a movement to lessen its
excesses has already produced "substantial reforms." Id. at 264. Perhaps we should entertain the
possibility that more litigators are resorting to vicious practices even though reforms are redefining the
litigator's role in significantly less vicious ways. In that case, the motivation to behave viciously may
increasingly stem from forces, such as unprecedented competitive pressures and client aggressiveness,
that are external to the lawyer's legally and professionally defined role.
41. Id. at 265.
42. Id. at 264. Markovits excepts William Simon, to whom he attributes the view that adversary
lawyering can never be squared with impartiality because it inevitably implicates lawyers in injustice.
Id. at 261 n.94.
43. Id. at 264 (emphasis in original). This statement is difficult to evaluate because it does not
specify the adjudication system that would replace our adversary system. Surely, trial lawyers in civil
law countries, where litigation is conducted in an inquisitorial rather than an adversary system, do not
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Assuming that some recognizable version of the adversary system can
be impartially justified and that, in any event, adversarial lawyering with
its attendant vices will endure, Markovits sets out to redress the scholarly
preoccupation with third-personal morality by considering what legal
ethics looks like "from the point of view of the lawyer whom the
adversary system requires to embody these vices."'  He considers this a
necessary corrective because charges that lawyers lie, cheat, and abuse do
not become moot for lawyers just because the system in which they
commit these vices can be justified in the third person. Ordinary morality,
to which off-duty lawyers presumably subscribe, enjoins people to be
honest, to play fair, and to treat others kindly. Yet lying, cheating, and
abusing others on the job appear to betray those ordinary virtues, just as
Jim, if he chose on third-personal grounds to accede to the dictator's
pressure to kill an innocent, would betray his personal ideal.45
Consequently, the lawyer who views the adversary system excuse as "the
last word in legal ethics" yet takes ordinary moral values as her own ideals
even on the job must see herself "not as an independent moral agent" but
rather as a "draftee in a scheme not of her own making"; and, like Jim, she
will suffer a blow to her integrity.46 Nonetheless, Markovits argues,
lawyers over the years have found it possible to engage in "ordinarily
vicious" conduct yet preserve their integrity. The question is how they
have done so and whether that method is still available.
C. Role-based ethics as a source offirst-personaljustification
The premise of a role-based justification for conduct is that the actor
whose conduct is in question must be seen as a role occupant, not simply
as a person. Markovits correctly observes that when lawyers offer role-
based justifications for their conduct, their critics are skeptical because
they expect third-personal defenses that appeal to ordinary moral
principles.47 But he thinks that role-based justifications are "best
function, or see themselves, as judges.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 266.
46. Id. It seems to me that anyone who engages in a practice that is steeped in tradition, as
lawyers do, participates in "a scheme not of her own making." But how greatly the norms of her
practice clash with her personal ideals, and how great the perceived sacrifice, will vary considerably.
Although Markovits considers it crucial to recognize that concerns about the adversary lawyer's
integrity do not become moot even if adversary lawyering is third-personally justified, he speculates
that the distinction between the first- and third-personal points of view may not matter to a critic such
as William Simon, "who believes that adversary lawyering cannot in any event be third-personally
justified" Id. at 261 n.94.
47. For example, Professor Deborah Rhode accuses lawyers of evading moral responsibility by
"depend[ing] on a retreat into role that denies the need for reflection." DEBORAH RHODE, IN THE
INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 17 (2000) [hereinafter RHODE]. If
lawyers are to be more effectively enlisted in the pursuit of justice, Rhode argues, they will have to
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interpret[ed]" as first-personal arguments designed not to convince policy
makers or the world at large, but to insulate the lawyer's integrity from
charges that her actions, judged by ordinary moral principles, are
V iUS48vicious. 8
When role-based justifications succeed on the first-personal level, they
do so by relying on "role-based redescriptions" of conduct that provide an
independent evaluative scheme to compete with "ordinary" moral
evaluation in the role occupant's mind. 9 Under favorable conditions, they
can protect the integrity of a role occupant whose conduct would
otherwise strike him as immoral. Markovits suggests, for instance, that
prizefighters preserve their integrity by seeing themselves as boxing,
rather than as assaulting opponents.5" In like fashion, lawyers might
replace ideals that people (including off-duty lawyers) ordinarily hold with
specifically lawyerly ideals, and then recast their conduct accordingly."
48. Markovits, supra note 1, at 268. Role-based arguments have certainly played a vital role in
professional sefijustification, but I do not think all such arguments are "best interpreted" as first-
personal in the sense of being addressed or persuasive to lawyers alone. Lawyers often address such
arguments to policymakers or the general public. See, e.g., JAMES S. KUNEN, How CAN YOU DEFEND
THOSE PEOPLE?: THE MAKING OF A CRIMINAL LAWYER (1985). In my experience, those audiences
can sometimes be convinced by role-based responses to "ordinary" moral criticism. Take lay reactions
to a lawyer who learns in confidence from her client that the client has begun to use her services to
defraud a third party and who decides not to disclose the information to protect the victim. Some
nonlawyers might well conclude that the lawyer's silence cheats or abuses the victim. But data suggest
that others would find the silence acceptable on the role-based ground that lawyers must keep such
information confidential so that clients will not be discouraged from sharing it with them in order to
obtain good legal advice (which could include advice to abandon a fraudulent scheme). See Fred C.
Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 395 (1989) (providing survey data). Of
course, neither those who reject nor those who accept this role-based response may view the matter
from the standpoint of a neutral observer. The former may adopt the victim's perspective, but the latter
may take a client's perspective. See Theodore I. Koskoff, Introduction to THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S
CODE OF CONDUCT (Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyers Foundation, Public Discussion Draft
1980) reprinted in TRIAL, Aug. 1980, at 44, 46-47 (reporting that nonlawyers serving on a bar
committee assigned to draft a legal ethics code were "shocked by the concept that a lawyer would
reveal a client's secrets except in the most extreme circumstances," and that one nonlawyer asserted
that "'[w]hen I need a lawyer, I need him to be my lawyer ... and if he isn't going to be my lawyer, I
don't need him"')(emphasis in quotation). In other words, "ordinary people" may think they are being
impartial when they ponder such issues, but do not necessarily succeed in placing themselves behind a
Rawlsian "veil of ignorance." Markovits may wish to consider how often "ordinary" and Rawlsian or
"critical" third-personal assessments diverge and what implications the answer might have for his
argument.
49. Markovits, supra note I, at 271. Philosophers dispute whether role-based arguments are moral
arguments. Compare ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES: THE MORALITY OF ROLES
IN PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL LIFE 10-11, 14 (1999) (arguing that role-based evaluation "short
circuits" moral evaluation by redescribing conduct in practice-defined terms and that adversarial
practices can only be justified on grounds that are acceptable to those whom they disadvantage), and
Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 12 (1975)
(contrasting role-based justification with justification from "the moral point of view"), with ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 169-209 (1981) (arguing that rational moral evaluation must place actors
in some role, but noting that the function of many roles is contested and that even roles whose function
is clear may not commend a clear course of action in specific situations), and Alasdair Maclntyre,
What Has Ethics to Learn from Medical Ethics?, 2 PHIL. EXCHANGE 37, 46 (1978) (arguing that "no
one is ever an abstract moral agent" and that "moral agency is embodied in roles such as that of the
physician, the patient or the nurse," which are "mutually interdefined in terms of relationship").
50. Markovits, supra note 1, at 276.
51. /d.at277.
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One of Markovits's examples is the lawyer who makes legal arguments
that she herself rejects and who sees herself as advocating, not lying.52
D. Preserving one's integrity through role-based redescription requires
cultural support that is no longer available
The key lawyerly virtues in the role-based ethic that Markovits believes
lawyers found helpful in preserving their integrity in the past are loyalty
and statesmanship. Markovits insists that these virtues, to be discussed in
Part III of this Essay, "are not merely make-shift principles one might
dismiss as a cheap philosophical trick. Instead they reflect deep and
venerable values, which reveal the lawyer's role to involve a high
calling."53 But, after recalling that Jane could regard killing an innocent as
first-personally justified only because virtues tied to ideals of "ruthless but
effective command" were culturally familiar to her,54 Markovits argues
that the modem lawyer's cultural milieu cannot support role-based first-
personal ideals and that this may account for the "commonly observed
crisis" in the profession. 5
Markovits claims that a role can only supply convincing first-personal
ideals, virtues, and redescriptions if its occupants are not "shaken by the
fact that others reject these ethical concepts., 56 Effective roles must be
"authoritatively insular" rather than "cosmopolitan"; their occupants
"must not think of themselves as members of a role-independent ethical
culture, as coming under a duty to satisfy the ethical opinions of the world
at large."57 Markovits puts the cleric's, soldier's, and merchant's roles
among those that were played in the past by members of authoritatively
insulated sub-cultures. The insularity of these roles was preserved through
barriers to entry and through self-regulation. Role occupants strictly
controlled who could assume the role by requiring long apprenticeships
52. Id. at 270. For reasons given in the text accompanying notes 103-105, infra, I doubt that
"ordinary people" would regard this conduct as lying in any event.
53. Id. at 283. "Reveal," one wonders, to whom? One might suppose that, if these values are role-
based, only lawyers could appreciate them and conclude that theirs is a "high calling." See id. at 274
(stating that "role-based redescription appeals to values and ideals only role-inhabitants recognize").
But Markovits is not clear on this point. Though he is not a practitioner, his own statement expresses
such an appreciation. He also notes that even those who do not occupy roles have sometimes
"recognized and respected the roles' distinctive status [in the realm of] first-personal ethics." Id. at
289. If he means that nonlawyers as well as lawyers can recognize that the lawyer's role third-
personally justifies some acts that would be vicious in other contexts, then one wonders how sharply
he thinks ordinary morality diverges from role-based ethics. Cf. RHODE, supra note 46, at 71 (claiming
that it is itself a commonly accepted ethical principle that ethical obligations "depend on context").
More likely, Markovits means that nonlawyers have sometimes recognized that lawyers believe in
good faith (even if mistakenly) that their "vicious" acts are role-justified.
54. Markovits, supra, note 1, at 285.
55. Id. at 287-91. One wonders how Markovits, living in the same cultural milieu as modem
adversary lawyers, can muster the admiration he expresses, see text accompanying note 53 supra, for a
role-based ethic that he insists is no longer available to lawyers as a source of first-personal ideals.




Yale Journal of Law & the Hum nities, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol16/iss1/2
Schneyer
that developed dispositions to conform to the role. They also collectively
shaped and enforced their own role norms, and asserted jurisdiction over
intramural disputes.58
Markovits assumes that the lawyer's role remained authoritatively
insular in the United States until well into the nineteenth century, 59 but
argues that the role no longer provides convincing ideals and
redescriptions because its insularity has been lost.6° His evidence for the
loss is three-fold. First, lawyers have lost control over bar admissions and
membership, as evidenced by the Supreme Court's modem treatment of
the license to practice law not as a privilege but as a right that may not be
withheld or withdrawn without due process of law.6 1 Second, lawyers are
no longer trained through apprenticeships; they now study law at
universities, where professors pledge allegiance "to general academic
standards of truth rather than to specifically lawyerly ethical ideals."62
Third and "most importantly, the nature, source and status of the ethical
principles governing lawyers' professional conduct have all changed
dramatically," although their content "has not changed very much. 63
Markovits tries to document this "most important" change by tracing
the evolution of ABA-formulated ethics codes during the twentieth
century. He characterizes this evolution as follows: the Canons of
Professional Ethics (1908) presented general ideals of legal ethics as
"'fraternal admonitions"' expressing the views of "'right thinking
lawyers'.; 64 the Code of Professional Responsibility (1970) included
"specific, legally binding disciplinary rules"; and the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (1983) consist of "legally cognizable rules drafted
by a quasi-legislative process involving non-lawyers. 65
These developments, Markovits argues, have left lawyers powerless to
draw first-personal ethical ideals "from within the legal profession. '66
Consequently, modem adversary lawyers must now subordinate their
ordinary first-personal ideals of honesty, fair play, and kindness to a
legally structured role in which they find themselves lying, cheating, and
abusing others. The role-based ethic that once shielded lawyers from the
58. Id.
59. Id. at 289.
60. Id. For similar observations about the evolution and present state of the professions generally,
see E.A. KRAUSE, DEATH OF THE GUILDS: PROFESSIONS, STATES, AND THE ADVANCE OF CAPITALISM,
1930 TO THE PRESENT (1996) (likening modem developments in the professions to the collapse of
medieval guilds in Europe).
61. Markovits, supra note 1, at 289-90.
62. Id. at 290.
63. Id.
64. Id. (quoting Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1249-
50(1991).
65. Markovits, supra note 1, at 290. Markovits also notes, correctly, that federal courts and
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slings and arrows of ordinary morality may still be remembered, but our
cosmopolitan culture makes it unconvincing even to them.67
To underscore the bleak, even tragic, implications of this, Markovits
identifies two campaigns that have been launched in recent years to restore
the American lawyer's integrity, and argues that neither can succeed. The
bar's campaign to restore the "professionalism" of yesteryear 68 fails to
recognize the weight of the cultural forces that are dismantling many
formerly insular social roles in favor of "impartial cosmopolitan forms of
social organization and governance." 69 And the forward-looking campaign
led by academics such as David Luban and William Simon "to cast a new
role for lawyers that is more in line with modernity's egalitarian ideals...
fails to credit the [enduring] importance of the virtues associated with the
traditional lawyer's role."
70
The forward-looking campaign aims to supplant the lawyer's supposed
role obligation zealously to pursue lawful client ends through all lawfully
available means (without regard for the justness or worthiness of those
ends and means). It encourages lawyers instead to be "moral activists ' 71 or
to pursue their own visions of substantive justice in selecting and
representing clients.72 Markovits thinks that lawyers who approach their
work this way will "manipulate laws and legal institutions" in pursuit of
their own "justice-based" ends7 3 and, rather like Jane, will "adopt brutal
means" whenever necessary to achieve those ends. 74 This reconstructed
ethic (or role) might shore up the lawyer's sense of integrity by aligning
her (newly redescribed) "activism" or "pursuit of justice" with her first-
67. Id.
68 See, e-g., ABA COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM,".... IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE":
A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM (1986) [hereinafter ABA
COMMISSION].
69. Markovits, supra note 1, at 293. Unfortunately, Markovits does not elaborate on this rather
cryptic formulation.
70. Id. at 294.
71. David Luban proposes that lawyers conduct themselves as "moral activists." The activist
aims to share with her client responsibility for the ends she is promoting in her
representation; she also cares more about the means used than the bare fact that
they are legal .... [She] will challenge her client if the representation seems to
her morally unworthy; she may cajole or negotiate with the client to change the
ends or means; she may find herself compelled to initiate action that the client
will view as betrayal; and she will not fear to quit.
DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY xxii (1988).
72. See Markovits, supra note 1, at 294 n.156 (attributing this position to William Simon).
According to Simon, lawyers should have discretion not to assist clients in pursuing legally
permissible courses of action or asserting potentially enforceable claims unless doing so "would
further justice," a concept Simon equates with substantive legal ideals. William H. Simon, Ethical
Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1084-84 (1988). They should also have discretion
to assist clients by disregarding formally valid legal rules that violate fundamental legal values,
including rules that withhold minimal welfare support from substantively deserving but technically
ineligible applicants. Id. at 1115-16.
73. Markovits, supra note I, at 294.
74. Id. at 295.
[Vol. 16:45
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personal ideals. But, veering once more into the third-personal realm,
Markovits claims that its wide acceptance within the bar would have
serious costs for the legal order, because the lawyer's traditional role is a
vital response to the need to regulate the "'perpetual conflicts between
rival impulses and ideals"' that arise in all societies.75 Lawyers bent on
furthering their moral vision or notions of substantive justice cannot
"preside" over the resolution of these conflicts because such lawyers make
themselves parties to the conflicts.7 6 Markovits infers that our society will
continue to entrust its stability to lawyers who conform to some
recognizable version of their traditional role."
Markovits concludes that the "commonly observed crisis" in the legal
profession is "justified" and "should be deep."78 This is a richly suggestive
conclusion but not quite the empirically-grounded "diagnosis of the
modem adversary lawyer's ethical condition"79 I had expected. As he
frankly admits, it is one thing to say that a putative crisis is justified, quite
another to prove both that it is real and that it stems from a loss of faith in
traditional role-based ideals, virtues, and redescriptions.8 ° Focusing as he
does on what it is like, ethically rather than psychologically," to practice
law today, Markovits cannot prove the existence, source, or magnitude of
the putative crisis by citing evidence that lawyers are unhappy with their
careers or drink too much.82 And he makes no effort to specify the "truth
conditions" for determining whether or not a purely ethical crisis exists,
which would probably be a fool's errand in any event. One either finds his
argument intuitively appealing, or one does not. I think there is something
to it, but less than meets the eye.
II. SOME PROBLEMATICS OF MARKOVITS'S ARGUMENT
Although his argument certainly has some appeal,83 Markovits relies on
75. Id- at 283 (quoting STUART HAMPSHIRE, INNOCENCE AND EXPERIENCE 189 (1989)). Such
conflicts are unlikely to subside in Western democracies, whose hallmark is ethical pluralism. Indeed,
philosopher John Rawls predicted some years ago that in these polities the diversity of moral and
political values "may increase." John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 1,4 (1987).
76. Markovits, supra note 1, at 283. 1 share this assessment, but question whether the obvious
dangers of a bar whose members all approached their work this way would materialize if only a
modest percentage of the bar did so.
77. Id. at 283-84. Cf Paul R. Tremblay, Moral Activism Manqu6, 44 S. TEXAS L. REv. 127, 155-
58, 179 (2002) (observing that the campaign to encourage lawyers to approach their work as "moral
activists" has so far been a failure and attributing the failure to the fact that practicing lawyers find the
world morally and factually more ambiguous than do scholars waging the campaign).
78. Markovits, supra note 1, at 297.
79. Id. at 226.
80. Id. Markovits recognizes that lawyers have more prosaic reasons to be dissatisfied with their
work - e.g., long hours, job insecurity, and intense competition for clients. Id.
81. Id.at210.
82. Id. at 211 n.l.
83. It also has interesting parallels in Alasdair Macintyre's argument that moral discourse in the
2004]
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several claims and a methodological choice that I believe are open to
challenge or at least call for clarification. Part II will question his
treatment of the adversary system as the key determinant of the lawyer's
role, the robustness of his claim that the lawyer's role obligations require
conduct that ordinary morality regards as lying and cheating, his decision
to treat the "present regime" of lawyering norms as a "given," and the
historical account of the American bar that anchors his conclusion that a
role-based ethic can no longer preserve the lawyer's integrity.
A. Does the adversary system deserve the emphasis Markovits gives it?
It is true that the United States has an adversary legal system in which
the lawyer's role usually calls for partisanship, loyalty, and zeal.84 It is
also true that these expectations differ markedly from the impartial roles
we assign to judges and, less clearly perhaps, to legislators with particular
constituencies. Yet the lawyer's role is neither as distinctive nor as
uniform as these contrasts imply, and this in turn suggests then the
adversary system has influenced the role less than Markovits supposes.
For one thing, his expansive definition of an adversary legal system as
one in which lawyers "represent clients rather than justice writ large" is
idiosyncratic. If one instead views the adversary system purely as one
method of adjudication and recognizes that most American lawyers
litigate rarely, if at all, then lawyers' practices and the rules that
underwrite them cannot simply be chalked up to that system's functional
needs." They may owe as much or more to the lawyer's status as agent or
representative. Since all agents must take instructions from and be loyal to
their principals, they routinely exalt their principals' interests over
others'. 6 This includes the many agents, lawyers or not, who negotiate
modem world is in a catastrophic state because we have lost the unifying frameworks that coherent
moral discourse requires and are left with fragments from earlier discourses which no longer make
sense because they have been wrenched out of the specific contexts in which they once had meaning.
See Jean Porter, Tradition in the Recent Work of Alasdair MacIntyre, in ALASDAIR MCINTYRE 38, 39-
40 (Mark Murphy ed. 2003) (discussing Maclntyre's position).
84. In some bar circles, however, the traditional lawyer's concept of "warm zeal" has taken on a
pejorative connotation. For example, the terms "zeal" and "zealous" were recently excised completely
from the Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct in favor of the notion that lawyers should behave
"honorably." The rationale for the change was that "some lawyers had misinterpreted the term
'zealous' to be a justification for rudeness, belligerence, and otherwise unprofessional conduct that
disparages the profession." Lynda C. Shely, The New Rules of Professional Conduct: An Overview,
ARiz. ATT'Y, Oct. 2003, at 28-29. One might suppose that this change evidences a collective loss of
faith among lawyers in role-based ethics, but I would interpret it instead as an effort to discourage
practices that are not called for by the adversary lawyer's role, rightly understood, and indeed that
deviate from that role.
85. Cf LUBAN, supra note 71, at 57-58 (suggesting that adversarial lawyering may be structured
more by the lawyer-client relationship than by the structure of adjudication). The implications of this
point for Markovits's argument are obscured by his failure to clarify the range of lawyers he has in
mind. At times, he seems concerned with litigators alone, but he repeatedly calls his subjects "modem
adversary lawyers" and he implies elsewhere that his argument is generalizable to a broader segment
of the bar or even to the entire legal profession. See supra notes 4, 5, and 12.
86. See Wendel, supra note 10, at 423-24 (pointing out that lawyers, no less than other agents, are
[Vol. 16:45
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business deals. The duties associated with their role make them partisans,
of course, but may also promote some conduct that ordinary morality
would consider lying or cheating. Yet those duties are obviously not
designed with the adversary system in mind. 7
To see how this might qualify Markovits's argument, consider a lawyer
and a lay agent who are each negotiating on a client's behalf to purchase
property. Each client has authorized his representative to accept the best
price below $100,000 that she can get, each seller asks if she has authority
to accept a $98,000 offer, and each agent flatly says "no." The legal ethics
rule that bars false statements of material fact to a third party in
negotiations permits this answer88 and the general legal principles that
govern negotiating agents presumably do so, as well. If ordinary morality
views the answer as a lie, and the lawyer is culturally foreclosed from
finding "negotiating on behalf of a client" to be a convincing role-based
redescription of her response, then on Markovits's analysis the lawyer's
integrity would presumably suffer a blow. But the lay agent's integrity
would be no less assaulted. Given Markovits's view that the legal
profession's crisis "reflects," and is "intricately involved in, other crises of
moral justification ... in the modem world,"89 one wonders whether he
thinks that all negotiating agents are in the same, demoralizing boat.
On the other hand, insofar as our traditional adversary system does
press American litigators to engage in ordinarily vicious conduct, one
wonders whether Markovits thinks that the ethical condition of litigators
operating in European and Latin American inquisitorial systems is
substantially different. There is some evidence that he does think so,9" but
there is no clear basis for such a distinction. According to Geoffrey
Hazard, civilian lawyers have "responsibilities much the same as those
contemplated in American law, and compared with American lawyers,...
are just as partisan if not more so. It is simply that in civil litigation in the
civil law regimes, the advocates must use techniques of lower visibility."'"
duty-bound to obey the lawful instructions of their client-principals).
87. By contrast, ethics rules that explicitly govern the legal advocate's role are surely designed
with adversary proceedings in mind. It is worth noting, however, that even professional norms that
could encourage litigators to engage in "vicious" conduct in settlement negotiations (as well as in
court) may sometimes serve as a useful countervailing force to the time pressures, economic pressures,
and divided loyalties that can tempt litigators to provide shoddy, conflicted, or indifferent
representation that puts their own clients at an unfair disadvantage and perhaps "cheats" them to boot.
See Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984 Wis. L. REV.
1529, 1545.
88. MODEL RULES, supra note 16, at R. 4.1 cmt. 2.
89. Markovits, supra note 1, at 211.
90. See id. at 295-96 n.162 (distinguishing inquisitorial from adversary procedures). But cf id. at
212 n.3 (stating that "[e]ven the most mildly adversary lawyer remains fundamentally different from
the judge").
91. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Is There an American "Legal Profession "?, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1463,
1465 (2002). But see Catherine Rogers, Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of
Conduct for International Arbitration, 23 MicH. J. INT'L L. 341, 357-73 (2002) (arguing that civil and
common law systems impose very different ethical obligations on litigators but that the differences are
2004]
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As for the uniformity of the American lawyer's role, Markovits notes
that "negotiators or legal compliance advisers" tend to be "less one-sided
or aggressive" than litigators, thereby recognizing that American lawyers
play some roles that differ significantly from the advocate's role in
litigation. 92 But he never addresses the extent to which lawyers playing
these non-litigation roles may also be exposed to charges of viciousness,
although he does suggest that even these lawyers "will be influenced by
what they think they can achieve by resorting to litigation or the threat of
litigation."9 3 It is therefore worth noting that the legal obligations
associated with some non-litigation roles94 are relatively unlikely to
expose them to charges of undue partisanship, let alone charges of
viciousness.
For example, transactional lawyers are sometimes called upon to
prepare third-party opinions that evaluate a client's legal circumstances for
the benefit of others. The lawyer qua evaluator is expected to approach her
task in the objective spirit of a judge.95  Lawyers serving as
"intermediaries" help multiple clients with potentially conflicting interests
to work out the terms of a new business venture. The lawyer qua
intermediary is forbidden to act as a partisan for one co-client at the
expense of another.96 And lawyers serving as counselors are encouraged to
apprise their clients of "relevant moral and ethical considerations,"
97
which often reflect a concern for third-party or societal interests.98
often masked by superficial similarities).
92. Markovits, supra note 1, at 212 n.3.
93. Id.
94. Although Markovits is interested in what it is like to practice law under "the present regime,"
id. at 210, he cites very little authority, other than the Model Rules, as indicative of that regime. For
purpose of this essay, I shall follow suit.
95. See MODEL RULES, supra note 16, at R. 2.3. It would be naive to suppose that lawyers always
do approach the evaluator's role disinterestedly, just as it would be naive to suppose that CPAs always
conduct audits disinterestedly, but the point is that legal and professional norms recognize that they
should.
96. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 2.2 & cmt. 1 8 (2001). The ABA dropped this
rule from the Model Rules in 2002, not because the intermediary's role was viewed as unwholesome,
but because the relationship between that rule and others governing conflicts of interest was murky
and because "it was no longer considered necessary to establish the propriety of common
representation through a separate Rule." STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF
LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 194 (2004) (quoting an explanation from a report of the ABA
Ethics 2000 Commission for the deletion).
97. MODEL RULES, supru note 16, at R. 2.1 cmt. $ 2.
98. Of course, the Model Rules may encourage lawyers to raise these considerations for the
client's sake rather than for the sake of third-party or societal interests. One famous bar leader's
position on what the counselor's role calls for is similarly ambiguous. Elihu Root, who counseled big
business clients in early twentieth-century New York City, is often associated with the view that a
counselor's job is not to tell a client what it may not do, but simply to tell the client how it can lawfully
do what it wants, without referring to moral considerations. But his most famous statement on the
counselor's role is quite different: "About half the practice of a decent lawyer," he claimed, "consists
in telling would-be clients that they are damned fools and should stop." See JAMES WILLARD HURST,
THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAWMAKERS 345 (1950).
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B. To what extent does the lawyer's role promote conduct that is
ordinarily viewed as lying or cheating?
As noted earlier, Markovits illustrates the distinction between role-based
and "ordinary" morality on which his argument rests99 by citing the
example of prize fighters, who, in the face of the criticism that they
"assault" their opponents, supposedly protect their integrity by relying on
a role-based redescription of their work as "boxing," a sport that features
the ideals of courage, athletic grace, and fair play." 0 But, contrary to his
intention, this example suggests how fuzzy both the dictates of "ordinary
morality"' ' and the line between ordinary and role-based morality can be.
Boxing is a consensual activity. If "ordinary people," including boxing
fans and detractors alike, view assault as "hitting others without their
consent," as seems likely, they have no reason to view boxers as
assailants. And boxers have no corresponding need to resort to role-based
redescription of their work in order to sleep at night.'0 2
Similar complexities arise when we examine two litigation practices that
Markovits thinks ordinary moral evaluation would construe as lying and
cheating, respectively. 0 3 He claims that presenting to a tribunal a non-
frivolous legal argument that the advocate herself "rejects" or does not
"believe" (meaning, I presume, an argument she would reject if she were
the judge) is a practice that ordinarily good people would consider
lying.0 4 Such arguments are certainly partisan, but does ordinary moral
99. Markovits recognizes that "some ordinary moral ideas" have been absorbed into the lawyer's
role-based ethic, but believes that the two moral views remain distinct enough to make his position
meaningful. Markovits, supra note 1, at 272 n.105.
100. Id. at 275.
101. Some normative legal ethics scholarship relies on dubious assertions about ordinary morality
to justify or criticize professional conduct. For example, Deborah Rhode argues that commonly
accepted ethical principles would permit a lawyer to assist a client in applying for welfare benefits
even when it is "obvious from [the] client's circumstances" that the client has undisclosed income that
makes her "technically ineligible." RHODE, supra note 46, at 77. Conceding that such assistance would
be "indefensible in other contexts," she claims that it is justified in the welfare case on the
"conventional" principle that "[a]n impoverished mother struggling to escape welfare stands on
different ethical footing than a wealthy executive attempting to escape taxes." Id. at 79. As I have
pointed out elsewhere, the problem with this "principle" is that even though political conservatives
could embrace it no less than liberals, their understanding, contrary to Rhode's, would be that the
executive had the firmer footing! Schneyer, Reforming Law Practice, supra note 8, at 1847. See also
Monroe H. Freedman, How Lawyers Act in the Interests of Justice, 70 FORDHAM. L. REV. 1717, 1726
(2002) (suggesting how Rush Limbaugh might react to Rhode's argument).
102. Concededly, my criticism of Markovits's boxing example loses its force insofar as the
ordinary moral charge against prizefighters is that engaging in physical violence is vicious even when
consensual. At one point Markovits refers to the "ordinary" charge as "assault"; at another point, as
engaging in "physical violence." Markovits, supra note 1, at 276.
103. To be sure, "ordinary moral evaluation" might well lead to the conclusion that other
lawyering practices, though lawful, do constitute lying, cheating, or abuse. My point here is simply
that ordinary morality may not regard lawyers' role-sanctioned practices as lying or cheating as often
as Markovits supposes, in which case the ethical condition of today's lawyers may not be as grave as
he supposes-even if lawyers now find role-based redescriptions less convincing than they once did.
104. Markovits, supra note 1, at 229, 264. In a penetrating essay, Professor Jack Sammons
recently argued that not making an argument on behalf of a client "because it is not an argument that
would move the lawyer were he or she the judge" should be regarded within the community of lawyers
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assessment lead to the conclusion that they are lies? In common parlance,
lies are statements that are intended to convey a false impression or that
are at least known by the speaker not to correspond to the true state of
affairs. If all a lawyer vouches for in making a non-frivolous legal
argument is that it is worthy of the court's consideration, and if judges
understand this, I fail to see why laymen would consider the argument a
lie, ' 5 unless they mistakenly supposed that the lawyer was vouching for
more. But if that were the unhappy case, then even in our cosmopolitan
culture, I doubt that the lawyer who presents such arguments would
experience a loss of integrity. And if that is not the case, the lawyer, like
the prize fighter, would need no role-based redescription to fall back on.
Markovits also claims (1) that litigators are spurred by their role to
"pursue claims for their clients which, while facially valid, are in fact
pressed to gain a strategic advantage or even to distract or delay the course
of a lawsuit"'0 6 and (2) that such conduct is not only partisan but the
ordinary vice of cheating as well. Again, I disagree. First of all, much of
the strategic maneuvering that Markovits presumably has in mind, though
perhaps common, is more likely to constitute role deviance than
conformity. Rules of procedure bar the filing of pleadings or motions "for
an improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation."' 10 7 The Model Rules forbid
lawyers to delay cases in order to frustrate "an opposing party's attempt to
obtain rightful redress or repose," and posit that clients have "no
legitimate interest" in "realizing financial or other benefit from otherwise
improper delay."' 0 8 And lawyers who file otherwise valid claims to obtain
results for a client that are beyond the purposes contemplated for the
judicial process may be liable in tort for abuse of process.0 9
as cheating, because it violates the expectations of judges, lawyers, and presumably clients that
lawyers will play the advocate's role in litigation. Jack L. Sammons, "'Cheater! ": The Central Moral
Admonition of Legal Ethics, Games, Lusorv Attitudes, Internal Perspective, and Justice, 39 IDAHO L.
REv. 273, 273-74 (2003) [hereinafter Sammons]. Sammons adds, however, that conduct that is
consistent with the expectations governing a practice at a given time but will erode the quality of the
practice over time might also count as cheating. Id. at 284.
105. On the other hand, if the lawyer knowingly presented a frivolous argument in violation of
the rules and expectations that put such arguments beyond the pale, then lawyers and nonlawyers alike
could fairly regard him as lying, because he would be tacitly and falsely representing that the argument
was worthy of consideration and not beyond the pale.
106. Markovits, supra note 1, at 218. See also id. at 265 (describing adversary lawyers as
"exploit[ing] unfair strategic advantages").
107. FED. R. CIV. PRO. R. 1 l(b)(1). See also MODEL RULES, supra note 16, at R. 4.4 (barring the
use of "means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third
person").
108. Id., at R. 3.2 cmt.
109. See, e.g., Rohda v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 689 F. Supp. 1034 (D. Colo. 1988) (holding that
using discovery in a civil case to obtain information that would benefit the client in a criminal case
arising out of the same events is abuse of process); Wilson v. Hayes, 464 N.W.2d 250 (Iowa 1990)
(recognizing that use of judicial process to coerce defendant to do something for which the process
was not intended can support a claim for abuse of process).
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This, of course, is not to say that every resort to "hardball" tactics in
litigation constitutes unlawful role deviance. But insofar as such tactics are
lawful and common, I think ordinary morality would regard them as
partisan but not as cheating. When people speak of someone cheating at
cards, on an exam, on his taxes, or on his spouse, the common thread is
that in each case the actor seeks an unfair advantage by violating rules or
expectations that are constitutive of the activity or practice he is engaged
in." 10 If Markovits thinks cheating is commonly understood in a different
way, an explanation is in order.
C. What ifMarkovits had not taken the "present regime" as a "given"?
In developing his account of legal ethics from the lawyer's point of
view, Markovits confines himself to exploring what it is like to practice
law "under the system of ethical rules that we now have.""' As he
correctly notes, this task calls for interpreting the law rather than trying to
influence its course." 2 Still, by confining himself to identifying or
interpreting current rules, he misses some evidence that seems highly
relevant to his argument, namely, the tenor of the extensive debates that
have occurred within the bar in recent years concerning both the lawyer's
proper role and the implications of that role for the norms that should
govern law practice. This evidence is relevant because many lawyers have
participated in those debates, including the protracted ABA debate that
occurred during the six-year process in which the Model Rules were first
formulated." 3 Their motives for participating in the bar's ethical discourse
have been mixed, of course," 4 but my impression is that lawyers often
view their participation as part and parcel of what it means to be a
lawyer".5 and still resonate to the traditional idea that "[a]rticulation of the
110. For an account of why cheating is, and should be, so understood, see Sammons, supra note
104, at 280-91.
111. Markovits, supra note I, at 211.
112. Id-
113. See Theodore Schncycr, Professionalism as Politics: The Making of a Modern Legal Ethics
Code, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL
PROFESSION 95, 95 (Robert Nelson, David Trubek & Rayman Solomon eds., 1992) (claiming, on the
basis of archival research, that the ABA's six-year process for producing the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct was "the most sustained and democratic debate about professional ethics in the
history of the American bar") [hereinafter Schneyer, Professionalism as Politics]
114. See id. at 132-35 (noting the concern expressed in the Model Rules process not to design new
ethics rules that could serve as a basis for judicial expansion of lawyers' civil liabilities).
115. Alasdair Maclntyre has argued that longstanding communities (presumably including the
legal profession) have open-ended, dynamic traditions and derive their unity not from stasis but from
ongoing internal debate about goods that are contested within their tradition itself. Porter, supra note
81, at 42 (explicating Maclntyre's treatment of traditions in After Virtue). Philosopher Vincent Luizzi
also observes that the practice of legal ethics involves an ongoing process in which lawyers debate
how best to conceive of their role and tie rules of conduct to that conception. Moreover, he claims that
the openness of the legal ethics process to role reevaluation makes the process an attractive model for
the formulation of ethical principles in other domains. VINCENT LUIZZI, A CASE FOR LEGAL ETHICS.
LEGAL ETHICS AS A SOURCE FOR A UNIVERSAL ETHIC (1993). Markovits, by contrast, argues that
2004]
19
Schneyer: The Promise and Problematics of Legal Ethics from the Lawyer's Point of View
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2004
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
professional ethic is what makes a profession a moral enterprise."' 16
Three of Markovits's claims suggest why he may not have considered it
useful to look in this direction, namely, his claims that the content of the
ethics rules governing American lawyers "has not changed very much" for
a century,"' that lawyers can no longer draw first-personal ethical ideals
from "within the legal profession,"' 18 and that current ethics rules are
simply "legally cognizable rules drafted by a quasi-legislative process
involving non-lawyers."'1 9 No one who takes these positions is likely to
think that the modem bar debates that produce ethics rules, or the
voluminous ethics opinions that interpret them,12 ° or other bar discourse
on the lawyer's role can be mined for high-grade insights into how
lawyers think and talk about professional ethics. Yet, these sources do
yield up insights into lawyers' views on "ordinary morality," role-based
ethics, and the relationship between the two.
For example, the central document in the ABA's "professionalism"
campaign asserts that whenever a litigator's duty as an officer of the court
conflicts with her duty to her client, the latter must give way.' 2 ' This
seems not to have been a mere bow to external criticism based on ordinary
morality, but an expression of professional concern that clients are
increasingly pressing lawyers to use "scorched earth" tactics and thereby
abandon their proper role.'22 Similarly, my research on the ABA's Model
Rules process found that lawyers continue to debate ethical issues in role-
based terms but have nonetheless become responsive to the criticism that
lawyers too often justify sharp practices outside of litigation by reference
to the traditional litigator's duties. As a result, the Model Rules now
expressly distinguish the advocate's role from other legitimate roles,
whose duties are presumably less likely to expose lawyers to charges that
they lie, cheat, or abuse third parties.'23
lawyers have lost the ability to draw role-based ideals from within the profession because the
profession has been transformed from a traditional institution in which authority rests on "the sanctity
of age-old rules" into a bureaucratic institution in which the authority of rules depends on their
"expediency" or "value-rationality." Markovits, supra note 1, at 291.
116. Lisa H. Newton, Lawgiving for Professional Life: Reflections on the Place of the
Professional Code, I Bus. & PROF'L ETHICS 41 (Fall 1981).
117. Markovits, supra note 1, at 290. This seems to me to imply, mistakenly, that the content of
ethics rules has neither changed nor been hotly debated for many decades.
118. ld. at 291.
119. id. at 290.
120. On the origin, functions, and significance in professional governance of bar association
ethics committees and their opinions, see Ted Finman & Theodore Schneyer, The Role of Bar
Association Ethics Opinions in Regulating Lawyer Conduct: A Critique of the Work of the ABA
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 29 UCLA L. REv. 67, 68-82 (1981).
121. ABA COMMISSION, supra note 68, at 28-30.
122. Id. at 30.
123. See Schneyer, Professionalism as Politics, supra note 113, at 137-38 (discussing the
evolution of specialized standards for lawyers serving as counselors, evaluators, and intermediaries).
See also MODEL RULES, supra note 15, at R. 2.4 & cmt. (recognizing the lawyer's role as "third-party
neutral" and addressing some of the issues that confront lawyers who serve in that role).
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Although lawyers today may be more likely than they once were to
judge their own practices by "ordinary" moral standards, recent bar
debates also suggest that tensions between those standards and role-based
norms are not, or at least not simply, a source of demoralization.
Arguably, those tensions are being put to productive use, spawning
integrity-preserving reforms that bring the two into better alignment
without apparent harm to the adversary system. After vigorous debate, for
example, the ALI and the ABA have recognized a "humanitarian"
exception to the lawyer's duty of confidentiality. This exception permits
lawyers to disclose otherwise confidential information whenever
disclosure is reasonably necessary to "prevent death or substantial bodily
harm."' 24 One might suppose that this exception is a grudging response to
public sentiment, but the moral entrepreneur who sponsored it was
Monroe Freedman, one of the bar's staunchest defenders of litigators'
traditional role obligations.'25 Contrary to Markovits's reading,'26 the
ABA has also adopted Model Rules provisions that permit a lawyer, as
earlier rules did not, to withdraw from representation when a client insists
on taking action that the lawyer considers "repugnant," and, in some cases,
to limit the scope of an engagement to exclude actions that the lawyer
finds "repugnant or imprudent."' 27
Moreover, many lawyers and judges have supported reforms to mitigate
the excesses that now plague not only the adversary process, but litigators
themselves. Those excesses are due in part to the fact that many trial
lawyers no longer practice in a single locality with a stable community of
lawyers who can effectively govern their relations with one another on the
"what-goes-around-comes-around" principle. Instead, they often find
themselves in a prisoner's dilemma in which each side fears that things
will go badly if it is not the first to defect from a tacit agreement to be civil
and cooperative. Lawyers are trying to ease the problem collectively by
finding and supporting new ways to discourage sharp tactics. For example,
some litigators, though not all, have supported procedural reforms that
require the parties, without a discovery request, to turn important
information over to the other side soon after a suit is filed.'28 This reform
is designed to discourage the delaying tactics that Markovits thinks
ordinary morality would view as cheating, not simply as undue
partisanship. Similarly, groups of divorce attorneys in many cities now
124. Id., at R. 1.6 (b)(1); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 66(1)
(adopting the same rule for the American Law Institute, whose members are lawyers, judges, and law
professors). The exception applies even if the harm to be prevented would not be caused by a criminal
act or related to the matter on which the lawyer represents the client whose information is disclosed.
125. See MONROE H. FREEMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LEGAL ETHICS 146-47 (2d ed.
2002) (noting Freedman's sponsorship).
126. See supra note 16.
127. See id.
128. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. PRO. R. 26.1.
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style themselves as "collaborative lawyers" who help spouses resolve
disputes without adversary proceedings.' 29 The lawyers keep their clients
focused on negotiation by entering into a mutual withdrawal agreement
that disqualifies both lawyers from further involvement in the matter if
either party opts to proceed to litigation.'30
All of this suggests that even if lawyers are increasingly sensitive to
charges that they commit the "ordinary vices" of lying, cheating, and
abuse, the consequence may not be demoralization, but something more
constructive-the motivation to consider reforms that can help to preserve
their integrity without disserving the goals of the adversary system. Had
Markovits examined recent changes in ethical and procedural rules,
lawyer-initiated changes in practice, and the lively tenor of ethical
discourse within the bar, his conclusions about the ethical condition of
today's profession might have been more sanguine.
D. Has the American bar lost the insularity that arguably enables lawyers
to derive first-personal ethical ideals from within the profession?
Finally, the scant history that Markovits offers in order to show that the
profession has lost the "authoritative insularity" that once enabled lawyers
to gird themselves with role-based, integrity-preserving ideals, virtues, and
redescriptions is open to serious challenge.
As noted earlier, Markovits's historical account begins by assuming that
the profession remained authoritatively insular until well into the
nineteenth century 131 and it supports that assumption by citing
Tocqueville's remark that American lawyers of his day "displayed the
tastes and habits of the aristocracy.' 32 But if those lawyers acted on
aristocratic values, or on the "gentlemanly ethic" and "civic
republicanism" that are often attributed to them, 133 one might better
assume that their ethical ideals were class-generated, not generated by
internal professional reflection on the nature and requirements of the
lawyer's role. According to Professor Tom Shaffer, the rare statements of
professional norms for law practice that existed before 1850 "could not
and did not come from the profession itself' (as they did later), "because
129. See John Lande, Possibilities for Collaborative Law: Ethics and Practice of Lawyer
Disqualification and Process Control in a New Model of Lawyering, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1315 (2003).
The movement has swiftly grown and is recognized by professional leaders as a major innovation in
dispute resolution practice. Id. at 1325.
130. Id. at 1324-25. A topical issue in the field is whether withdrawal agreements unethically
restrict the scope of representation and deprive clients of control over their dispute. Id. at 1328-29.
131. Markovits, supra note 1, at 289.
132. Id. at 289 n.144.
133. See, e.g., THOMAS L. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS 59-84, 94-101 (1985) (making
these attributions). But ef Norman Spaulding, The Myth of Civic Republicanism: Interrogating the
Ideology ofAntebellum Legal Ethics, 71 FORD. L. REV. 1397 (2003) (arguing that civic republicanism
was by no means the bar's predominant antebellum ethic).
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the bar had no [institutional] voice with which to speak."'1 34
Next, Markovits fast-forwards to the twentieth century, disregarding the
period from Andrew Jackson's presidency until modem bar associations
began to spring up after 1870, a period that Roscoe Pound famously
labeled "The Era of Decadence."' 135 During that period, "the tide of...
democracy carried before it almost all previously existing standards" for
bar admission. 136 Under the Indiana Constitution of 1851, for example,
"[e]very person of good moral character, being a voter, [was] entitled to
admission to practice law in all courts of justice."'
37
If Pound's Era of Decadence were the end of the story, one would have
to concede that the bar had lost any vestige of authoritative insularity by
the mid-nineteenth century. But Markovits's account is further skewed by
his failure to recognize the ensuing period of re-professionalization. That
period, beginning in the late nineteenth century, featured the imposition of
new bar-initiated barriers to entry into the profession and the flowering of
increasingly active bar associations, including the ABA and, after 1920,
the "unified" (i.e., mandatory membership) bars that were created in most
states.138 The institutionalization of the bar continues today with the rapid
growth of specialty associations, 39 some of which make it part of their
mission to formulate ambitious, non-binding ethical guidelines for practice
in their fields. 4°
The post-1870 bar associations were conceived in large part as
corporate bodies that spoke not only for lawyers but to them, by
developing ethics codes, establishing ethics committees to interpret them
in advisory opinions, and enforcing them in disciplinary proceedings.
41
134. SHAFFER, supra note 125, at 101. By contrast, although entry into the English bar was highly
restricted by class, English barristers of the time were organized in the Inns of Court. See KRAUSE,
supra note 60, at 100-02.
135. ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 22342 (1953).
136. HURST, supra note 98, at 250.
137. Id. (quoting the Indiana constitution).
138. See Theodore J. Schneyer, The Incoherence of the Unified Bar Concept, 1983 AM. B.
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 1, 1 n.I.
139. See Judith Kilpatrick, Specialty Lawyer Associations: Their Role in the Socialization
Process, 33 GONZ. L. REV. 501, 508 (1997-98) (estimating that there are now more than 1,000
specialty bars in the United States and asserting that the number is growing rapidly). One might regard
the proliferation of specialty bars as a mark of professional fragmentation that will only diminish the
bar's ability to generate convincing role-based ideals. On the other hand, specialty bars are apt to
enjoy greater internal cohesion than today's general-purpose bar associations and may therefore be
better positioned to generate practice ideals that lawyers in their fields can embrace. See Robert W.
Gordon & William H. Simon, The Redemption of Professionalism?, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS'
PRACTICES, supra note 113, at 230, 243, 247 (making this point); Murray L. Schwartz, The Death and
Regeneration of Ethics, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 953, 954 (predicting a flowering of
aspirational norms addressed to "different groupings" of lawyers).
140. See, e g., A CTEC Commentaries on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 28 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 865 (1994).
141. See, e.g., JULIUS HENRY COHEN, THE LAW: BUSINESS OR PROFESSION? 158 (rev. ed.1924)
(discussing and quoting the views of Felix Adler, a philosopher and founder of the Ethical Culture
Society, that ethical problems in the professions must be solved by those who "live with" them, that a
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Even as French sociologist Emile Durkheim was arguing that each
profession needed its own associations to debate ethical issues, adopt
professional norms, and see to their enforcement,'42 American bar leaders
were implementing those ideas. 43
Moreover, the twentieth-century developments that Markovits cites to
document the profession's loss of authoritative insularity require
considerable qualification. For example, the Supreme Court's modern
treatment of the license to practice law as a right that may not be withheld
without due process 4 4 represented a trivial loss of professional authority;
contrary to the situation in England, control over bar admissions and
disbarment has never in our history been ceded completely to the
profession. 145
What about Markovits's "most important" evidence of the profession's
loss of authoritative insularity over the course of the twentieth century-
i.e., the evolution of the ABA's ethics codes from the 1908 Canons of
Professional Ethics, which presented general ideals of legal ethics as
"fraternal admonitions" expressing the views of "right thinking
lawyers,"' 46 to the current Model Rules, which consist of "legally
cognizable rules drafted by a quasi-legislative process involving non-
lawyers?" '147 One problem with this evidence is that Markovits never
explains why widespread adoption since 1970 of ABA ethics rules as
positive law implies that lawyers can no longer derive role-based ideals
and redescriptions from within the profession. He cites Robert Gordon's
accurate statement that "internalized norms" of legal ethics have become
"legalized" as corroborating his position,148 but I fail to see why the
legalization of internalized norms means that norms are no longer
internalized. Surely, the fact that positive law makes murder a crime does
nothing to shake our confidence that murder is morally wrong.
In addition, Markovits's descriptions of the Canons and the Model Rules
require qualification. While the Canons certainly had a hortatory ring,
ABA leaders who supported their adoption hoped they would become
positive law so that all lawyers would be subject to professional discipline
for violating them. "9 As for lay involvement in formulating the Model
general philosophy of ethics is not sufficient, that professional problems require constant application
of philosophy to fact, and that this "can best be done by the experts in the line"); Herbert Harley,
Group Organization Among Lawyers, 101 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POLITICAL & SOCIAL Sci. 33, 34,
37(1922) (arguing that professionals can be effectively and safely governed only by their peers).
142. EMILE DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIVIC MORALS 7 (1958).
143. See Schneyer, supra note 138, at 15-18.
144. Markovits, supra note 1, at 289-90.
145. See HURST, supra note 98, at 278.
146. Markovits, supra note 1, at 290, quoting Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics,
100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1249-50 (1991).
147. Markovits, supra note 1, at 290.
148. Id. at 291.
149. See Jacob M. Dickinson, President's Address, 33 ABA REP. 341, 356 (1908); Jacob M.
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Rules, the Kutak Commission that drafted the Rules included only two
non-lawyers and their role was negligible; one died soon after being
appointed and the other had no visible impact except to keep briefly alive
a proposal, later rejected, requiring all fee agreements to be in writing.15
Finally, Markovits correctly observes that federal courts and agencies
have become more active players in the overall mix of lawyer
regulation.15' State courts have also become more active regulators
through disqualification rulings, fee-award decisions, sanctions for
procedural violations, rulings on claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel, and legal malpractice decisions. Again, however, the implications
of these developments for the bar's capacity to articulate professional
ideals and norms that lawyers can and do embrace are unclear. While bar-
generated norms are sometimes trumped by legal standards from other
sources,152 the overlap remains great because the bar's norms have
considerable influence on the standards that courts apply in these
settings,153 as well as on the practice rules that federal agencies issue to
govern the lawyers (and lay representatives) who appear before them.'54
Even when agencies consider standards that depart from bar-generated
ethics rules, bar groups such as the ABA Tax Law Section often provide
influential input that limits the discrepancies. 5
Dickinson, Remarks Introducing the Report of the ABA Committee on Canons of Ethics, id. at 55, 56.
Moreover, some state supreme courts eventually recognized the Canons as "guidelines" in matters of
professional discipline or adopted them in rulemaking proceedings. See, eg., Hepp v. Petrie, 185 Wis.
350, 200 N.W. 857 (1924); Schneyer, supra note 138, at 19 & n.105. The fact that courts rarely
adopted the Canons in formal rulemaking proceedings may have reflected not so much the tenor of the
Canons, as the fact that state supreme courts in the early twentieth century were not yet confident of
their rulemaking authority.
150. Schneyer, Professionalism as Politics, supra note 113, at 108. A few comments were
submitted, however, by consumer advocates and government agencies, and the Kutak Commission
took an interest in press coverage of the project, though members of the much larger House of
Delegates that finally adopted the Rules did not. See id. at 109-11, 131-32.
151. A notable recent example is the promulgation of SEC rules to implement § 307 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.1-7. The rules govern securities lawyers
representing public corporations in SEC-related matters and may be in some tension with the ethics
rules in force in a security lawyer's licensing state. See Letter from SEC General Counsel to the
President and President-Elect of the Washington State Bar Association (July 23, 2003) (on file with
the author)(expressing concern about the bar's tentative intention to institute disciplinary proceedings
against any Washington lawyers who violate the confidentiality provisions of the state rules of
professional conduct in complying with new SEC rules that permit disclosure).
152. See supra note 150. See generally Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State,
70 N.C.L. REV. 1389 (1992)-
153. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (holding that "prevailing
professional norms ... as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like" are the proper
measure of attorney performance for purposes of ineffective assistance of counsel claims); Charles W.
Wolfram, The Code of Professional Responsibility as a Measure of Attorney Liability in Civil
Litigation, 30 S.C.L. REV. 281 (1979).
154. For a partial list of federal agencies that have required lawyers or representatives who appear
before them on behalf of clients to comply with ABA ethics rules, see Ernest F. Lidge Ill, Government
Civil Investigations and the Ethical Ban on Communicating with Represented Parties, 67 IND. L.J.
549, 624 n.356 (1992).
155. See Ted Schneyer, From Self-Regulation to Bar Corporatism: What the S&L Crisis Means
for the Regulation of Lawyers, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 639, 657-58 (1994) (documenting the ABA Tax
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I will not pretend that anything in this subpart proves that the American
legal profession today enjoys the kind of authoritative insularity that
Markovits considers essential if lawyers are to draw their first-personal
ideals, virtues, and redescriptions from within the bar. My point is simply
that the scant historical evidence he adduces falls well short of proving the
contrary and that the conditions necessary to support authoritative
insularity remain far from clear.
111. SITUATING MARKOVITS'S ACCOUNT OF THE "LAWYERLY VIRTUES"
WITHIN A THIRD-PERSONAL DEBATE AMONG LEGAL ETHICS SCHOLARS
One of the finest features of Legal Ethics from the Lawyer's Point of
View is its imaginative and sympathetic account of the "distinctively
lawyerly virtues" (or conceptions) of loyalty and statesmanship.156 These
virtues are central to the role-based ethic that Markovits believes once had
the power to protect the adversary lawyer's integrity against charges based
on the ordinary vices of lying, cheating, and abusing others. 5' Markovits
uses his account for the limited purpose of establishing the first-personal
importance of role-based ethics. Although he claims that the lawyerly
virtues of loyalty and statesmanship "reflect deep and venerable values"
that "reveal the lawyer's role to involve a high calling,"'5 8 he never
explicitly defends them in third-personal terms, i.e., as socially desirable
dispositions for lawyers to possess. Indeed, he suggests that the lawyerly
virtues (and role-based ethics in general) are irrelevant in the third-
personal domain because they can appeal "only to people who have
already accepted the role" that is associated with those virtues and, thus,
beg the question of whether the role itself is third-personally justified. 9
Part III of this Essay will suggest, however, that role-based virtue ethics,
as exemplified by Markovits's account of lawyerly loyalty and
statesmanship, is relevant to third-personal debate, partly for the practical
reason that judges and other policymakers who formulate the rules and
principles that govern law practice do tend to share with lawyers a
meaningful though fluid conception of the lawyer's role. 6 After
Section's influence in the early 1980s on the content of Treasury Department rules governing the
rendition of legal opinions concerning the prospect for realizing tax benefits by investing in tax
shelters, and the ABA Business Law Section's influence on federal banking agency guidelines for the
preparation of legal opinions in the wake of the S&L crisis in the early 1990's). Professor Markovits
disagrees with me on the significance of this point, arguing that the key development in recent years is
the agencies' more direct involvement in regulating the lawyers who practice before them, not their
deference to bar views in doing so. Markovits, supra note 1, at 290 n- 149.
156. Id. at 277.
157. Id. at 284.
158. Id. at 283. See also id. at 299 (asserting that his account of the lawyerly virtues presents a
"substantively attractive version of a distinctively lawyerly role ethic," albeit an ethic that is no longer
culturally available to lawyers) (emphasis in original).
159. Id. at 283-84.
160. For a philosophic defense of the use of role conceptions and virtue ethics in the third-
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summarizing Markovits's account of the lawyerly virtues, Part III
proceeds to situate the account in a current third-personal debate among
legal ethics scholars. I shall argue that the attractiveness of the virtues as
Markovits presents them implicitly indicts the "forward-looking
campaign," led by Luban and Simon, to encourage lawyers to practice
with the central aim of furthering their own visions of morality or
substantive justice. And I shall suggest by way of contrast that the
dispositions associated with those virtues fit far more comfortably with the
normative models of the lawyer's role that Norman Spaulding and Brad
Wendel have recently developed. Those models differ from one another in
important ways and deserve closer attention than I can give them here, but
both authors are explicitly critical of Luban and Simon's positions for
reasons much like the ones Markovits's cites in predicting that the
"forward-looking campaign" will fail to gain broad acceptance.
A. The "Lawyerly Virtues " of Loyalty and Statesmanship
Markovits fleshes out the distinctively lawyerly virtues of loyalty and
statesmanship with an analogy to John Keats's ideas about "the nature of
poetic sensibility," especially Keats's concept of "negative capability.
16 1
As the poet serves his subject by effacing himself, maintaining no identity
of his own, and functioning merely as a medium filling some other body
such as the Sea, 162 Markovits suggests, so the lawyer's loyalty serves her
clients by disposing her to efface herself, maintain no voice of her own,
and allow her clients to speak through her.163 This is a distinctively
lawyerly form of loyalty in two respects. People are ordinarily loyal to one
another for the sake of mutual advantage, but the lawyerly virtue of
loyalty calls for "an unusually selfless empathy."'" And while ordinarily
good people try when presented with disagreements to consider all points
of view before making up their minds, the loyal lawyer "adopts the first-
personal moral ambition to take her client's part," to see things through
her client's eyes, and to change positions as her client requires.
161
The lawyerly virtue of statesmanship, Markovits suggests, provides a
service to society that parallels the poet's contribution to human
understanding. As the poet contents himself with doubts, uncertainties,
and half-knowledge in order to arrive at otherwise unavailable insights, so
the lawyer's capacity to sustain "all sides of an argument" and to content
herself with "persuasion rather than proof' makes possible a procedural
justice to which the "over-impassioned flame of substantive right leaves us
personal realm, see the works of Alasdair Macintyre cited supra note 49.




165. Id. at 279.
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insensible. ' ' 166 And just as poetic uncertainty accommodates inconsistent
beliefs, so lawyerly uncertainty helps to accommodate inconsistent
interests, to construct compatible possibilities where others only see
contradictory certainties, and to redirect attention from deep conflicts
toward shallower matters. 167 These are knacks that every society requires,
but especially one whose hallmark is ethical pluralism.
168
Thus, the distinctive virtues of loyalty and statesmanship enable a
lawyer to speak from her clients' many points of view and not just on her
own behalf. Under the right cultural conditions, the lawyer can embrace
these role-based virtues, redescribe her practices accordingly, and thereby
reject at least some charges that she lies, cheats, and abuses others. It is
not the case that a lawyer imbued with these virtues will consider the very
idea that lawyers can lie, cheat, or abuse to be a solecism; rather, her self-
effacement and uncertainty will lead her to define those vices more
narrowly than people commonly do. With respect to lying, for example,
she will remain capable of recognizing both what it means to suborn
perjury and the fact that perjury disserves the judicial process. But she will
regard presenting "an argument she does not believe" as advocacy rather
than lying, because her role is to articulate what might be true rather than
to determine what is true. As for cheating, she will recognize that
unlawfully inflating an opposing party's litigation costs is wrong because
it violates legitimate expectations and closes rather than opens up the
litigation process. But she will not regard the pursuit of a lawful yet
substantively unfair outcome as cheating, because her role is not to decide
which party should prevail. And she will not consider it abusive to attack
adverse witnesses aggressively because her role is to expose weakness in
all positions.'69
Markovits does not deny that lawyers incur costs by cultivating these
distinctive virtues or dispositions: a loyal commitment to take the client's
part rather than her own means that the lawyer must often be insincere,
and a lawyer's statesmanship - her capacity to argue all sides and her
allegiance to procedures rather than outcomes - can leave her unsuited for
moral leadership. 7° But he claims that the successful cultivation of the
lawyer's role-based virtues can perform a worthwhile service for the
lawyer by instilling confidence that her practices embody her own first-
personal ideals. 7 '
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 280. Because Markovits describes the lawyerly virtue of statesmanship as providing a
service to society, it would be a mistake to think that the role-based ethic that he articulates is
concerned solely with furthering client interests.
169. Id. at 280-81.
170. Id.at281.
171. Id. at 282.
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If, as I believe, lawyers can still cultivate these virtues, might their
cultivation be worthwhile as well from a societal or third-personal
standpoint? I suspect that some readers will scoff at the idea and reject out
of hand Markovits's insistence that the virtues "are not merely make-shift
principles [that] one might dismiss as a cheap philosophical trick" but
instead "reflect deep and venerable values, which reveal the lawyer's role
to involve a high calling." '172 When litigators plead ignorance of the fact
that a client knowingly gave false testimony or invented frivolous claims,
for example, such readers are likely to conclude that those pleas are indeed
tricks - i.e., pretexts designed to explain away conduct that is motivated
by ends that are entirely external to law practice, such as self-interest in
earning fees, gaining professional advancement, or simply winning.'73
Because cynicism of this kind might fuel unfortunate reforms,174 I believe
Markovits has made a contribution to third-personal legal ethics by
effectively articulating an honorable role-based explanation for at least
some lawyers' pleas of ignorance.
B. Situating Markovits's Role-Based Ethic in an Ongoing Third-Personal
Debate
The deeper third-personal significance of Markovits's account of the
lawyerly virtues comes to light when the account is viewed in the context
of a normative debate that now appears to be shaping up between legal
ethics scholars. On one side are those, notably Luban and Simon, who for
some time have been waging the "forward-looking campaign" to
encourage lawyers to practice as "moral activists" or to pursue their own
visions of substantive justice.' 75 On the other side, I place Norman
Spaulding and Brad Wendel, who have recently criticized Luban's and
Simon's positions in the course of offering their own models of the
lawyer's proper role and exploring the implications of their models for the
principles that should govern lawyer conduct.'76
172. Id. at 283.
173 See. e-g., Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589,
618-20 (1985) (chastising lawyers for regularly invoking an "epistemological demurrer" to resist legal
and moral accountability for their participation in conduct later found to be fraudulent; claiming that
litigators are often better positioned than the court to resolve disputed issues; and arguing that lawyers'
pleas of ignorance imply a definition of knowledge more appropriate to the rigors of scientific debate
than to conventional legal discourse).
174. Cf Spaulding, supra note 9, at 2 (arguing that "we must be willing to suspend the
conviction.. that client-centered lawycring is the same as self-centered lawyering - that lawyers who
have perverted the service norm for their own interests are ideal typical for any client-centered
conception of the [lawyer's] role").
175. See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 71; WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE (1998).
176. See Spaulding, supra note 9; Wendel, supra note 10. Markovits claims that our modem,
cosmopolitan culture is not only hostile to the lawyer's traditional role-based ethic as he defines it, but
is more broadly "skeptical of social roles wherever they appear," at least when those roles are in
tension with ordinary, role-independent moral principles. Markovits, supra note 1, at 293. In my view,
however, the very fact that legal ethics scholars such as Spaulding and Wendel, who are trained as
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To grasp the crux of the debate, one must understand that Simon and
Luban developed their positions in opposition to what they regard as the
"standard" or "dominant" conception of legal ethics, a conception based
on the principles of Neutrality and Partisanship. (Neutrality encourages
lawyers to act without regard to the moral worthiness of a client's
objectives; Partisanship exhorts them to pursue client objectives up to the
limits of the law.) 177 Simon holds that the adversary lawyer's traditional
duty to represent her client zealously regardless of the justness of the
client's cause is pernicious because the duty inevitably implicates lawyers
in injustice; 178 Luban argues that lawyers should practice as "moral
activists" - sharing responsibility with her client for the ends being
promoted, caring more about the means used than the mere fact that they
are legal, challenging the client if the representation seems morally
unworthy, sometimes initiating action that the client will regard as
betrayal, and withdrawing if that proves morally necessary.
179
Markovits does not respond to these third-personal positions head-on.
Instead, he simply predicts that our polity will reject an ethic for lawyers
that rests on such positions. Yet his reasons for this prediction could easily
be restated as reasons to hope that that ethic will be rejected. He predicts
rejection because the positions imply that lawyers should "sit in judgment
over their clients" and decide how legal disputes "should be resolved," '
because lawyers who approach their work as moral activists or crusaders
for their own visions of substantive justice would be willing to
"manipulate laws and legal institutions in pursuit of [those] ends"'' and to
"adopt brutal means" whenever necessary to achieve them,' 18 2 because
such lawyers would make themselves parties to the perpetual conflicts that
arise in society and therefore could not be trusted to "preside" over their
resolution,' 83 and because the forward-looking campaign 'fails to credit
the importance of the virtues associated with the traditional lawyer's
lawyers, continue to generate models of the lawyer's role that are not grounded in ordinary, role-
independent morality casts some doubt on the validity of his broader claim.
177. See Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984 WIS.
L. REV 1529, 1534- 1 have argued elsewhere (a) that the so-called "standard conception of legal
ethics" is only one of several conceptions of the lawyer's role that over time have vied for dominance
and (b) that, unlike many sciences, normative legal ethics has no paradigm. Id. at 1567-69.
178. See note 72 & accompanying text supra.
179. See supra note 71. Luban and Simon seem to expect that lawyers who style themselves,
respectively, as moral activists or crusaders for substantive legal ideals will act in furtherance of
progressive political values. But the political diversity of the American bar, which mirrors the ethical
pluralism of American society, makes it impossible to predict whether a profession committed to
moral activism and the pursuit of substantive justice would tend to promote progressive or
conservative values. See Ted Schneyer, Some Sympathy for the Hired Gun, 41 J. LEGAL ED. 11, 20
(1991) [hereinafter Schneyer, Some Sympathy].
180. Markovits, supra note 1, at 264 (emphasis in original).
181. Id. at 294.









If this is not an explicit indictment of the third-personal merits of Simon
and Luban's positions, it is certainly an implicit one, based at least in part
on Markovits's respect for the lawyerly virtues of loyalty and
statesmanship. Moreover, it is strikingly similar to the third-personal
objections to those positions that Spaulding and Wendel explicitly raise.
Spaulding's Reinterpreting Professional Identity claims that the project
of explicating professional ethics has been dominated for some time by
scholars who are "fundamentally hostile to the concept of client-centered
representation and convinced that it is to blame for professional
misconduct and malaise." '185 Spaulding accepts the view that the role that
prevailing ethics rules endorse envisions a lawyer who will diligently
represent a client irrespective of any "personal, moral, or ideological
affinity between them."' 86 But, far from joining the critical bandwagon, he
defends that service ideal against the forces that he thinks are increasingly
pushing lawyers toward unduly "thick identification" with clients. Those
forces of course include increased competition and specialization that
limits lawyers to a particular clientele. But Spaulding argues that they also
include the very thinking that Simon, Luban, and others have employed in
attacking the client-centered service tradition.
Those attacks claim that encouraging the lawyer to select and zealously
represent clients whose interests and lawful objectives do not necessarily
square with her own vision of substantive justice or moral worth has
spawned both lawyer malaise and professional misconduct that harms
third-party and societal interests.'87 Spaulding counters that the cure
Simon and Luban propose is essentially to turn the lawyer's role into "an
object of self realization for the lawyer"'188 and that exhorting lawyers to
"choose clients and shape their work according to a principle of moral
identification '  is a prescription for greater professional failure. 9  In
184. Id. at 294 (emphasis added). Taken together, these reasons evince a concern that lawyers
who only represent clients to whose objectives the lawyers are personally and passionately committed
are more likely than lawyers who adhere to the Neutrality principle or to the role-based ethic that
Markovits describes to use vicious tactics and flout norms of procedural justice. I share that concern.
See Ted Schneyer, Some Sympathy, supra note 179, at 20 (noting that lawyers who use excessive
tactics often believe passionately in their clients' cause). Moreover, I have argued that American
lawyers, far from embracing the Neutrality principle, often identify closely with their clients and their
clients' causes. Id. at 14-15.
185. Spaulding, supra note 9, at 1.
186. Id. at6.
187. Id. at 38-39.
188. Id. at 7 (emphasis in original). I join Spaulding in rejecting this cure. But just as Spaulding
insists that Simon and Luban unfairly criticize lawyers for using the principles of Neutrality and
Partisanship as mere pretexts for lawyers self-interested conduct, see supra note 174, so calling their
cure a proposal to turn the lawyer's role into "an object of self realization for the lawyer" rather than a
misguided effort to contribute to social welfare may be unfair.
189. Id. at 39.
190. Id. (stating that "increased autonomy for lawyers to choose clients and shape their work
according to a principle of moral identification may actually exacerbate professional misconduct").
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other words, compared to the "thick identification" with client causes that
Simon and Luban endorse, the "thin identification" with clients that the
principles of Neutrality and Partisanship endorse (and, in my opinion, the
"lawyerly virtues" encourage) provides more assurance that the legal
profession will make a positive contribution in a society whose hallmark is
ethical pluralism. 
191
Wendel's Civil Disobedience presents a normative model, the "authority
conception," that regards legal ethics as properly the concern of political
rather than moral philosophy.' 9 The model derives its normative force not
from a commitment to client autonomy per se, but "from the reasons that
confer legitimacy upon legal directives, ' 93 chiefly, the capacity of law to
"enable collective social action despite ethical pluralism."1 94 The model
imposes substantial public responsibilities on lawyers, charging them as
quasi-officials to ensure that legal institutions can resolve disputes despite
the persistent conflicts that ethical pluralism fuels. 195 And it recognizes
that if the law is to provide a final settlement of such disputes, it must be
identifiable without reference to socially contested moral criteria.
Accordingly, "lawyers are duty bound not to frustrate the achievement of
law by reintroducing contested moral values into the domain of law ... as
the basis for an ethically motivated decision to act or not act on behalf of a
client."' 196 Thus, the "authority conception" vindicates the principle of
Neutrality. "If," Wendel writes, "the lawyer says to the client, in effect,
'You have a legal entitlement to X, but I refuse to assist you in obtaining
that entitlement for moral reasons,' the lawyer is simply reinscribing in the
attorney-client relationship the very moral disagreement the law was
intended to preempt."
197
191. Id. at 38-39, 53, 76-81. As Spaulding notes, the Model Rules honor the Neutrality principle
not by requiring lawyers to accept all (paying) clients who seek their services, as English barristers are
expected to do, but by proclaiming that ""representing a client does not constitute approval of the
client's views or activities'." Id. at 21, quoting MODEL RULES, supra note 16, R. 1.2 cmt. 5.
192. Wendel, supra note 10, at 364.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 364-65.
In discussing their proper role in a society characterized by "a diversity of reasonable moral beliefs,"
id. at 381, Wendel calls lawyers "quasi-political actors" who "act in the name of society" by
channeling normative disagreements into "an authoritative process of resolution." Id. at 384. The term
"quasi-political actors" is similar in meaning to "officers of the court," but Wendel eschews the latter
term because it has been used so variously and vacuously in the past. Id. at 384 n.90 Cf Schneyer,
Some Sympathy, supra note 179, at 15 (suggesting that lawyers who select engagements on the basis
of the Neutrality principle may be animated by a vision of the lawyer as "officer of the court," and
defending that practice as follows: "just as their office requires judges to hear all cases and apply the
law equally to all parties, morally attractive or not, so the lawyer's office may be said to entail a
willingness to serve all comers" because "equal protection of the laws implies equal protection by
lawyers no less than by judges").
196. Wendel, supra note 10, at 366.
197. Id. at 382. However, the authority conception does not wholly embrace the principle of
Partisanship. The conception implies that the lawyer should not refuse on moral grounds to invoke
procedural rights in order to obtain lawful client objectives, but it enjoins the lawyer not to engage in
"loophole lawyering" to achieve those objectives. Id. at 395. Loopholes, according to Wendel, are
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In this respect, the authority conception is substantially at odds with
Luban's moral activist model and Simon's substantive justice model,
neither of which shows much regard for the fact that a client's aims are
permissible under the law. In Wendel's view, Luban treats the client's
substantive and procedural rights as irrelevant to a lawyer's work unless
invoking and protecting those rights is also morally justifiable by the
lawyer's lights,1 98 while Simon thinks that "apparent legal entitlements are
not really part of the law unless they track moral principles."'1 99 From a
client's point of view, Wendel asserts, these positions make legal rights
meaningless. In exalting the lawyer's moral agency over the client's legal
rights, they give no normative weight to the lawyer's legal duty, as an
agent, to carry out the lawful instructions of her principal.2"'
It is presumptuous of me to draft Markovits into a third-personal debate
for which he has not enlisted, especially when one of his theses is that
legal ethics scholars have focused too much on third-personal issues and
neglected first-personal ones. My excuse is simply that this important
debate may be furthered by pointing out that Markovits's sympathetic
treatment of the lawyerly virtues of loyalty and statesmanship is strikingly
aligned with Spaulding's and Wendel's criticisms of Luban's and Simon's
positions. Of course, if Markovits is correct in his assessment that lawyers
are now culturally foreclosed from embracing an ethic that is not grounded
on "ordinary morality," then the profession may be no more likely to rally
around Spaulding's or Wendel's position than it is to embrace Luban's or
Simon's.
CONCLUSION
Professor Markovits has clearly enriched legal ethics scholarship by
giving novel and imaginative attention to the problems of first-personal
justification that contemporary lawyers may face when their role
obligations appear to conflict with "ordinary morality." My reservations
about his diagnosis of the "commonly observed crisis" in the legal
profession notwithstanding, I look forward to his further thoughts on how
lawyers might be protected from whatever threats to their integrity those
conflicts pose. I also hope he will more explicitly present and defend the
third-personal positions that I believe are implicit in Legal Ethics from the
Lawyer's Point of View. In my opinion, however, an effective foray into
created by the logical possibility of attaching meanings to legal texts that lie outside the realm of
plausibility as viewed from the standpoint of the interpretive community comprised of lawyers and
judges. Id. at 396. Even when "loophole arguments" are not clearly prohibited by rules against
frivolous claims or the like, the authority conception would enjoin their use because such arguments
fail to honor the authoritative settlement of conflicting values and interests that legal texts represent.
198. Id. at 372.
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these realms will require more attention than this article displays to the
details of professional history, the complexities of the law of lawyering,
the vagaries of "ordinary morality," and the structural pressures and
constraints that lawyers face. As things stand, the article may tell us more
about current trends in academic moral philosophy than it tells us about
the practice of legal ethics.
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